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 I. 
                                                
Introduction 
On April 24, 2001 the European Commission presented a proposal for a Directive
1 
introducing supplementary supervision of financial conglomerates (the Proposed Directive).  The 
Proposed Directive requires a closer coordination among supervisory authorities of different sectors of the 
financial industry and leads to changes in the number of existing Directives relating to the supervision of 
credit institutions, insurance undertakings and investment firms.
2 
The principal objective of the Proposed Directive is to face the accelerating pace of 
consolidation in the financial industry and the intensification of links between financial markets.  Over the 
past years, a number of cross-sector groups combining insurance companies, banks and investment firms 
have been created and have become of significant importance in the European Union (EU).  Such groups 
straddle traditional sectoral boundaries.
3  Combined financial operations may create new prudential risks 
or exacerbate existing ones.
4 Laws and regulations in the different financial sectors have traditionally 
adopted different approaches with different definitions of capital, different types of risks and different 
 
1  European Commission Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the supplementary 
supervision of credit institutions, insurance undertakings and investment firms in a financial conglomerate and amending 
Council Directives 73/239/EEC, 79/267/EEC, 92/49/EEC, 92/96/EEC, 93/6/EEC and 93/22/EEC, and Directives 98/78/EC and 
2000/12/EC of the European Parliament and the Council (Brussels, April 24, 2001), COM(2001) 213 final, O.J. Eur. Comm. 
No. C 213 E/07 (2001). 
2  The Proposed Directive requires changes in the following Directives: 
(1)  First Council Directive 73/239/EEC of 24 July 1973 on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative 
provisions relating to the taking-up and pursuit of the business of direct insurance other than life assurance, O.J. Eur. 
Comm. No. L 228/3 (1973) [herein First Non-Life Insurance Directive]. 
(2)  First Council Directive 79/267/EEC of 5 March 1979 on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative 
provisions relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of direct life assurance, O.J. Eur. Comm. No. L 63/1 
(1979) [herein First Life Assurance Directive]. 
(3)  Council Directive 92/49/EEC of 18 June 1992 on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions 
relating to direct insurance other than life assurance and amending Directives 73/239/EEC and 88/357/EEC (third non-
life insurance Directive), O.J. Eur. Comm. No. L 228/1 (1992) [herein Third Non-Life Insurance Directive]. 
(4)  Council Directive 92/96/EEC of 10 November 1992 on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative 
provisions relating to direct life assurance and amending Directive 79/267/EEC and 90/619/EEC (third life assurance 
Directive), O.J. Eur. Comm. No. L 360/1 (1992) [herein Third Life Assurance Directive]. 
(5)  Council Directive 93/6/EEC of 15 March 1993 on the capital adequacy of investments firms and credit institutions, 
O.J. Eur. Comm. No. L 141/1 (1993) [herein Capital Adequacy Directive]. 
(6)  Council Directive 93/22/EEC of 10 May 1993 on the investment services in the securities field, O.J. Eur. Comm. No. L 
141/27 (1993) [herein Investment Services Directive]. 
(7)  Directive 98/78/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 October 1998 on the supplementary 
supervision of insurance undertakings in an insurance group, O.J. Eur. Comm. No. L 330/1 (1998) [herein Insurance 
Groups Directive]. 
(8)  Directive 2000/12/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 March 2000 relating to the taking up and 
pursuit of the business of credit institutions, O.J. Eur. Comm. No. L 126/1 (2000) [herein Banking Directive]. 
3  European Commission, Explanatory Memorandum to the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on the supplementary supervision of credit institutions, insurance undertakings and investment firms in a financial 
conglomerate and amending Council Directives 73/239/EEC, 79/267/EEC, 92/49/EEC, 92/96/EEC, 93/6/EEC and 93/22/EEC, 
and Directives 98/78/EC and 2000/12/EC of the European Parliament and the Council (Brussels, Apr. 24, 2001), COM(2001) 
213 final, O.J. Eur. Comm. No. C 213 E/07 (2001) [herein Explanatory Memorandum], at 2, sub 1. 
4  Id.   
capital requirements.
5 For instance, insurance supervisors have historically been primarily concerned with 
the liability side of the balance sheet as the main source of risk, although assets are of course monitored 
too.
6 Regulations in the banking sector regard the asset side of the balance sheet as the principal source of 
risk, although an examination of the source of funding is an important aspect of the supervisory process.
7 
Securities supervisors require securities firms to have sufficient liquid assets to repay promptly all 
liabilities at any time.
8 If a financial conglomerate that spans a number of financial markets the scope for 
potential supervisory problems increases due to the web of financial interrelationships characteristic for 
financial conglomerates.  On the other hand, such conglomerates may gain financial solidity by spreading 
that risk.
9 The Proposed Directive intends to ensure the stability of the European financial market, to 
establish common prudential standards for the supervision of such financial groups throughout Europe, 
and to introduce level playing fields and legal certainty between financial institutions.
10 
The basic philosophy of the Proposed Directive is that the solo supervisions of 
individually regulated entities should continue to be the foundation for effective supervision, but that 
there is a need for the various supervisors to establish a coordinated approach to supervision in order that 
prudential assessment can also be made from a group-wide perspective.
11 
It should be remembered that EU Directives generally are not directly applicable in the 
Member States, but that they must be transformed into national law.  They are addressed to the Member 
States and bind them in terms of the objectives to be achieved.  However, in many cases the Member 
States are granted discretion with respect to the method by which the objectives will be accomplished in 
their respective national legislation. 
Furthermore, the Proposed Directive constitutes only a proposal by the Commission and 
still has to pass the Council and the European Parliament where the text is discussed at present.  It is 
anticipated that the Proposed Directive will be finally adopted in December 2002.
12 A number of 
                                                 
5  Tripartite Group of Bank, Securities and Insurance Regulators, The Supervision of Financial Conglomerates (Basle: Bank for 
International Settlements, July 1995) [herein Tripartite Report], at 39, sub no. 104; Joint Forum on Financial Conglomerates, 
Supervision of Financial Conglomerates (Feb. 1999) [herein Joint Forum Report], at 6, Capital Adequacy Principles Paper, 
sub no. 6. 
The Tripartite Group was formed at the initiative of the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision (Basle Committee) in early 
1993 to address a range of issues relating to the supervision of financial conglomerates. 
The Joint Forum was established in early 1996 under the aegis of the Basle Committee, the International Organization of 
Securities Commissions (IOSCO) and the International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) to take forward the work 
of the Tripartite Group. 
6  Tripartite Report, supra note 5, at 16, sub no. 41. 
7  Id. 
8  Id. 
9  Id. 
10 Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 3, at 2, sub 1. 
11 Tripartite Report, supra note 5, at 16, sub no. 42. 
12 European Commission, Progress on the Action Plan for Financial Services – Annex, available at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/en/finances/actionplan/annex.pdf (last visited Mar. 22, 2001), at 10. 
  2  
interested parties have already commented on the text and proposed amendments.
13 Thus, it is very likely 
that the present text will be changed in some points. 
II. 
                                                
Current Consolidated Supervision of Credit Institutions 
According to the Banking Directive,
14 consolidated supervision of credit institutions
15 
generally applies to all credit institutions (i) having another credit institution or a financial institution
16 as 
 
13 See, e.g., Opinion of the European Central Bank of 13 September 2001 at the request of the Council of the European Union on 
a proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the supplementary supervision of credit 
institutions, insurance undertakings and investment firms in a financial conglomerate and amending Council Directives 
73/239/EEC, 79/267/EEC, 92/49/EEC, 92/96/EEC, 93/6/EEC and 93/22/EEC, and Directives 98/78/EC and 2000/12/EC of the 
European Parliament and the Council (COM(2001) 213 final), CON/2001/25, O.J. Eur. Comm. No. C 271/10 (2001); Opinion 
of the Economic and Social Committee on the ‘Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
supplementary supervision of credit institutions, insurance undertakings and investment firms in a financial conglomerate and 
amending Council Directives 73/239/EEC, 79/267/EEC, 92/49/EEC, 92/96/EEC, 93/6/EEC and 93/22/EEC, and Directives 
98/78/EC and 2000/12/EC of the European Parliament and the Council’ (Brussels Oct. 17, 2001), CES 1309/2001 – 2001/0095 
COD, O.J. Eur. Comm. No. C 36/1 (2002); Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament, Report 
on the proposal for a European Parliament and Council directive on the supplementary supervision of credit institutions, 
insurance undertakings and investment firms in a financial conglomerate and amending Council Directives 73/239/EEC, 
79/267/EEC, 92/49/EEC, 92/96/EEC, 93/6/EEC and 93/22/EEC, and Directives 98/78/EC and 2000/12/EC of the European 
Parliament and the Council (Feb. 27, 2002), A5-0060/2002, available at http://www2.europarl.eu.int/omk/OM-
Europarl?PROG=REPORT&L=EN&PUBREF=-//EP//NONSGML+REPORT+A5-2002-
0060+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN&LEVEL=2&NAV=S (last visited Mar. 22, 2001); Finnish Delegation, Note No. 14019/01 to the 
Working Party on Financial Services – (Conglomerates) on the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on the supplementary supervision of credit institutions, insurance undertakings and investment firms in a financial 
conglomerate and amending Council Directives 73/239/EEC, 79/267/EEC, 92/49/EEC, 92/96/EEC, 93/6/EEC and 93/22/EEC, 
and Directives 98/78/EC and 2000/12/EC of the European Parliament and the Council (Brussels, Nov. 15, 2001), available at 
http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/01/st14/14019en1.pdf (last visited Mar. 22, 2001); Presidency of the Council of the 
European Union, Report No. 14140/1/01 to the Permanent Representatives Committee/Council on the Proposal for a Directive 
of the European Parliament and of the Council on the supplementary supervision of credit institutions, insurance undertakings 
and investment firms in a financial conglomerate and amending Council Directives 73/239/EEC, 79/267/EEC, 92/49/EEC, 
92/96/EEC, 93/6/EEC and 93/22/EEC, and Directives 98/78/EC and 2000/12/EC of the European Parliament and the Council 
(Brussels, Nov. 30, 2001), available at http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/01/st14/14140en1.pdf (last visited Mar. 22, 2001); 
Position Paper of the Banking Federation of the European Union on the Proposed Directive on the Supplementary Supervision 
of Financial Conglomerates (Brussels, Oct. 3, 2001), available at http://www.fbe.be/pdf/PositionpaperFiCo.pdf (last visited 
Mar. 22, 2001). 
14 Art. 52(1) & (2), Banking Directive, supra note 2 no. (8). In the Banking Directive several Directives, including Council 
Directive 92/30/EEC of 6 April 1992 on the supervision of credit institutions on a consolidated basis, O.J. Eur. Comm. No. L 
110/52 (1992), were combined in a single text for reasons of clarity. Regarding the question of consolidated supervision of 
credit institutions, the Banking Directive did not make any substantive changes.
.The Banking Directive was amended by 
Directive 2000/28/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 September 2000 amending Directive 2000/12/EC 
relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions, O.J. Eur. Comm. No. L 275/37 (2000), in order to 
take into account the development of electronic money institutions by including such institutions in the definition of a credit 
institution set out in Art. 1(1), Banking Directive. Electronic money institutions are defined in Art. 1(3)(a), Directive 
2000/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 September 2000 on the taking up, pursuit of and prudential 
supervision of the business of electronic money institutions, O.J. Eur. Comm. No. L 275/39 (2000), as credit institutions 
issuing means of payment in the form of electronic money. 
15 Pursuant to Art. 1(1), first subparagraph, Banking Directive, supra note 2 no. (8), credit institution means: 
(a)  an undertaking whose business is to receive deposits or other repayable funds from the public and to grant 
credits for its own account; or 
(b)  an electronic money institution within its meaning of Directive 2000/46/EC, see supra note 14. 
For the purpose of supervision on a consolidated basis, credit institution means a credit institution according to Art 
1(1), first subparagraph, Banking Directive, and any private or public undertaking which corresponds to the definition 
in Art. 1(1), first subparagraph, Banking Directive, and which has been authorized in a third country. 
A credit institution may, in addition to deposit taking and lending, engage in any of the activities of Annex I to the Banking 
Directive. These activities are set forth infra note 16. 
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a subsidiary
17 or holding a participation
18 in such institutions, or (ii) whose parent undertaking is a 
financial holding company.
19 This means that consolidated supervision is only exercised regarding groups 
of which the parent companies are either credit institutions or financial institutions.
20 
                                                                                                                                                             
16  Pursuant to Art. 1(5), Banking Directive, supra note 2 no. (8), financial institution means an undertaking other than a credit 
institution, the principal activity of which is to acquire holdings or to carry on one or more of the activities listed in points 2 to 
12 of Annex I, Banking Directive:  
2. Lending, 
3. Financial  leasing, 
4.  Money transmission services, 
5.  Issuing and administering means of payment (e.g., credit cards, travellers’ cheques and bankers’ drafts), 
6.  Guarantees and commitments, 
7.  Trading for own account or for account of customers in 
(a)  money market instruments (cheques, bills, certificates of deposit, etc.), 
(b) foreign  exchange, 
(c)  financial futures and options, 
(d)  exchange and interest-rate instruments, 
(e) transferable  securities, 
8.  Participation in securities issues and the provision of services related to such issues, 
9.  Advice to undertakings on capital structure, industrial strategy and related questions and advice as well as 
services relating to mergers and the purchase of undertakings, 
10. Money  broking, 
11.  Portfolio management and advice, 
12.  Safekeeping and administration of securities. 
Point 1 is “acceptance of deposits and other repayable funds”. An institution that engages in that activity (and also makes 
loans) is a credit institution. Point 13 is “credit reference services” and point 14 is “safe custody services”. 
It is curious that under the wording of Art. 1(5), Banking Directive, supra note 2 No. (8), (“… the principal activity of which is 
to acquire holdings or …”), an undertaking that holds only or principally participations in undertakings that are not engaged in 
financial activities (i.e., industrial holding company) qualifies as financial institution. See, e.g., for the German approach, 
§ 1(3) Gesetz über das Kreditwesen of July 10, 1961, 1961 BGBl. I 881, in the version of Sept. 9, 1998, 1998 BGBl. I 2776, as 
amended [herein KWG], defining financial enterprise (Finanzunternehmen) as including such industrial holding companies. 
See Karl-Heinz Boos, Reinfried Fischer & Hermann Schulte-Mattler, KREDITWESENGESETZ, at 171, § 1 annotation 160 (2000). 
The definition of an industrial holding company as financial institution remains without consequence for purposes of 
consolidated supervision unless a credit institution is part of the holding group. 
17 According to Art. 1(13), second subparagraph, Banking Directive, supra note 2 no. (8), for the purpose of supervision on a 
consolidated basis, the term subsidiary means a subsidiary undertaking as defined in Art. 1(1), Seventh Council Directive 
83/349/EEC of 13 June 1983 based on the Article 54(3)(g) of the Treaty on consolidated accounts, O.J. Eur. Comm. No. L 
193/1 (1983) [herein Consolidated Accounts Directive], and, in addition, any undertaking over which, in the opinion of the 
competent authorities, a parent undertaking effectively exercises a dominant influence.  
Art. 1(1), Consolidated Accounts Directive defines the terms parent undertaking and subsidiary undertaking as follows: a 
parent undertaking is an undertaking 
(a)  having a majority of the shareholders’ or members’ voting rights in another undertaking (a subsidiary undertaking), or  
(b)  having the right to appoint or remove a majority of the members of the administrative, management or supervisory body 
of another undertaking (a subsidiary undertaking) and is at the same time a shareholder in or member of that undertaking, 
or  
(c)  having the right to exercise a dominant influence over an undertaking (a subsidiary undertaking) of which it is a 
shareholder or member, pursuant to a contract entered into with that undertaking or to a provision in its memorandum or 
articles of association, where the law governing that subsidiary undertaking permits its being subject to such contracts or 
provisions, or  
(d)  being a shareholder in or member of an undertaking and a majority of the members of the administrative, management or 
supervisory bodies of that undertaking (a subsidiary undertaking) who have held office during the financial year, during 
the the preceding financial year and up to the time when the consolidated accounts are drawn up, have been appointed 
solely as a result of the exercise of its voting rights, or  
  4  
The following diagram shows the credit institutions that are subject to consolidated 
supervision under the Banking Directive: 
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20% or more  20% or more 
Financial 
Institution 
For an understanding of the scope of consolidated supervision under current EU law, it is 
important to remember that a financial institution is an institution that principally carries on one or more 
of the “banking” activities listed in points 2-12 in Annex I to the Banking Directive
21 but that is not a 
                                                                                                                                                             
(e)  being a shareholder in or member of another undertaking (a subsidiary undertaking) and controls alone, pursuant to an 
agreement with other shareholders in or members of that undertaking a majority of the shareholders’ or members’ voting 
rights in that undertaking.  
Art. 1(2), Consolidated Accounts Directive states that an undertaking may be considered as a parent undertaking if (a) it 
actually exercises a dominant influence over the subsidiary undertaking, or (b) it and the subsidiary undertaking are managed 
on a unified basis by the parent undertaking.  In any case, the parent undertaking must hold a participating interest in the 
subsidiary undertaking as defined in Art. 17, Fourth Council Directive 78/660/EEC of 25 July 1978 based on Article 54(3)(g) 
of the Treaty on the annual accounts of certain types of companies, O.J. Eur. Comm. No. L 222/11 (1978) [herein Annual 
Accounts Directive]. Art. 17, first sentence, Annual Accounts Directive defines the term participation as rights in the capital of 
other undertakings, whether or not represented by certificates, which, by creating a durable link with those undertakings, are 
intended to contribute to the company’s activities. Art. 17, second sentence, Annual Accounts Directive additionally provides 
that the holding of a part of the capital of another company shall be presumed to constitute a participating interest where it 
exceeds a percentage fixed by the Member States that may not exceed 20%. 
18 According to Art. 1(9), Banking Directive, supra note 2 no. (8), participation for the purpose of supervision on a consolidated 
basis means the ownership, direct or indirect, of 20% or more of the voting rights or capital of an undertaking. 
19 Under the terms of Art. 1(21), Banking Directive, supra note 2 no. (8), financial holding company means a financial institution, 
the subsidiary undertakings of which are either exclusively or mainly credit institutions or financial institutions, one at least of 
such subsidiaries being a credit institution. 
The term exclusively or mainly does not refer to the activities of the separate subsidiaries but to the whole group of 
subsidiaries. Thus, only if most of a financial institution’s subsidiaries meet the definitions of credit institution or financial 
institution, such financial institution qualifies as financial holding company. The German KWG, supra note 16, follows the 
same concept, see Boos, Fischer & Schulte-Mattler, supra note 16, at 171, § 1 annotation 162. 
20 A financial institution having a large credit institution as a subsidiary in many cases would constitute a financial holding 
company. However, if a financial institution principally holds participations in the non-financial sector and has one or more 
credit institutions which in the aggregate play a minor role in the group, the financial institution does not meet the definition of 
financial holding company because its subsidiaries do not exclusively or mainly consist of credit institutions or financial 
institutions as required in Art. 1(21), Banking Directive, supra note 2 no. (8). Thus, the relative size of the credit institution 
that is a subsidiary of a financial institution as compared to the other subsidiaries of the financial institution determines 
whether the group is subject to consolidated supervision; the absolute size of the credit institution is not relevant. 
21 Supra note 2 no. (8). 
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depository institution.
22  It is also important to recall that Annex I includes not only deposit taking and 
lending and other more traditional banking activities, but also activities that in the United States would be 
considered as investment banking, such as underwriting, dealing and brokering. 
Consolidated supervision essentially means that the authority supervising the credit 
institution being part of a group must apply the financial data of the whole group in monitoring 
compliance by the credit institution with its supervisory standards (such as capital adequacy, solvency 
ratio, lending limits, and restrictions on investments by credit institutions in the non-bank sector).
23 
As a general rule, the authorities must require full consolidation of all credit institutions 
and financial institutions that are subsidiaries of a parent undertaking.  However, under certain 
circumstances, proportional consolidation may be required.
24 
In the case where the parent of a credit institution is another credit institution, supervision 
on a consolidated basis will be exercised by the Member State of the EU that authorized such parent 
undertaking.
25  However, where the parent undertaking of a credit institution is a financial holding 
company, consolidated supervision will be exercised by the Member State of the EU that authorized the 
credit institution.
26  This means that the credit institution is always the addressee of consolidated 
supervision.  However, when a financial holding company holds credit institution subsidiaries in more 
than one Member State, supervision on a consolidated basis will be undertaken by the Member State 
where the financial holding company and one credit institution have been set up.
27 If the financial holding 
company has been set up in a Member State in which no credit institution subsidiary is located, the 
Member States concerned (including the Member State in which the financial holding company was set 
up) will have to reach an agreement as to which Member State shall exercise consolidated supervision.
28 
In the absence of such agreement, the supervising Member State is selected on the basis of the largest 
credit institution balance sheet and, if that figure is the same in two or more Member States, on the basis 
of the first date of authorization of the credit institution subsidiaries.
29 
With regard to the sectors of insurance groups and investment groups the European legal 
framework provides similar consolidated supervision of such groups.
30 
                                                 
22 See supra notes 15 and 16. 
23 Art. 54, Banking Directive, supra note 2 no. (8). For a discussion of the consolidated supervision of credit institutions in the 
EU, see Michael Gruson, Prudential Regulation by the European Union, Chapter 6, § 6.04, in 2 REGULATION OF FOREIGN 
BANKS, UNITED STATES AND INTERNATIONAL (Michael Gruson & Ralph Reisner eds., 3d ed. 2000), at 245-251. 
24 Art. 54(1), Banking Directive, supra note 2 no. (8). 
25 Art. 53(1), Banking Directive, supra note 2 no. (8). 
26 Art. 53(2), first subparagraph, Banking Directive, supra note 2 no. (8). 
27 Art. 53(2), second subparagraph, Banking Directive, supra note 2 no. (8). 
28 Art. 53(2), third subparagraph, Banking Directive, supra note 2 no. (8). 
29 Id. 
30 The Capital Adequacy Directive, supra note 2 no. (5), requires prudential regulation of investment firm groups, and the 
Insurance Groups Directive, supra note 2 no. (7), requires additional supervision of insurance groups. 
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III. 
A. 
                                                
Determination of Financial Conglomerates and the Addressees of Supplementary 
Supervision 
General 
The existing EU legal framework for the supervision of financial institutions is 
incomplete because it only covers the so-called sectoral supervision, i.e., supervision over institutions 
within a particular sector of the financial industry.
31  Cross-sectoral supervision of financial groups, 
combining institutions from different financial sectors, exists only to a limited extent.
32 The Proposed 
Directive uses the term financial sector to refer to the banking, insurance, or investment services sector or 
a combination of all or some of such sectors.
33 A regulated entity is defined as a credit institution, an 
insurance undertaking or an investment firm.
34 This definition itself does not require that the regulated 
entity must be located in the EU and therefore also includes non-EU entities.  However, only such 
regulated entities which have obtained an authorization pursuant to one of the sectoral Directives
35 are 
subject to supplementary supervision within the meaning of the Proposed Directive.
36 Such an 
 
31 The Banking Directive, supra note 2 no. (8), provides for consolidated supervision of banking groups; the Capital Adequacy 
Directive, supra note 2 no. (5), provides for prudential regulation of investment firm groups; and the Insurance Groups 
Directive, supra note 2 no. (7), provides for additional supervision of insurance groups. 
32 E.g., Arts. 55(2) & 56(4), Banking Directive, supra note 2 no. (8), require cooperation and exchange of information between 
the different supervisory authorities if a credit institution, financial holding company or mixed-activity holding company has as 
a subsidiary an insurance company or another undertaking providing investment services. 
33 Art. 2(7), Proposed Directive. Sectoral rules means the EU legislation relating to the prudential supervision, in particular laid 
down in the First Non-Life Insurance Directive, supra note 2 no. (1), the First Life Assurance Directive, supra note 2 no. (2), 
the Insurance Groups Directive, supra note 2 no. (7), the Capital Adequacy Directive, supra note 2 no. (5), the Investment 
Services Directive, supra note 2 no. (6), and the Banking Directive, supra note 2 no. (8). Art. 2(6), Proposed Directive. 
34 Art. 2(4), Proposed Directive.  
For the purpose of the Proposed Directive, the following definitions apply: 
According to Art. 2(1), Proposed Directive credit institution means a credit institution within the meaning of Art. 1(1), 
second subparagraph, Banking Directive, supra note 2 no. (8) (see supra note 15). 
According to Art. 2(2), Proposed Directive insurance undertaking means an undertaking within the meaning of Art. 6, 
First Non-Life Insurance Directive, supra note 2 no. (1), Art. 6, First Life Assurance Directive, supra note 2 no. (2), or 
Art. 1(b), Insurance Groups Directive, supra note 2 no. (7). 
According to Art. 2(3), Proposed Directive, investment firm means an investment firm within the meaning of Art. 1(2), 
Investment Services Directive, supra note 2 no. (6): any legal person whose regular occupation or business it is to 
provide any investment service for third parties on a professional basis, i.e., any of the following activities listed in the 
Annex to the Investment Services Directive: brokerage, dealing as principal, portfolio management, underwriting, 
offering underwriting related services, investment advice, making margin loans and safekeeping and administration, all 
in connection with certain types of securities, and giving advice on capital structure, industrial strategy and merger and 
acquisition advice and providing safe custody services and foreign exchange services where these foreign exchange 
services are connected with the provision of investment services. Art. 2(3), Proposed Directive also includes in the 
definition of investment firm so-called recognized third-country investment firms as referred to in Art. 2(4), Capital 
Adequacy Directive, supra note 2 no. (5). Pursuant to that definition, an undertaking constitutes a recognized third-
country investment firm if it (i) would be covered by the definition of investment firm in Art. 2(2), Capital Adequacy 
Directive if it were established within the EU, (ii) is authorized in a third country, and (iii) complies with prudential 
rules considered by the competent authorities as at least as stringent as those laid down in the Capital Adequacy 
Directive. 
35 Art. 6, First Non-Life Insurance Directive, supra note 2 no. (1); Art. 6, First Life Assurance Directive, supra note 2 no. (2); 
Art. 3(1), Investment Services Directive, supra note 2 no. (6); Art. 4, Banking Directive, supra note 2 no. (8). 
36 Arts. 1 & 4(1), Proposed Directive. 
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authorization is only required for undertakings that are located in the EU.
37 Thus, supplementary 
supervision only applies to regulated entities that are established and authorized in the EU.
38 
It is important to note that the Proposed Directive does not replace the existing 
supervision of the different sectoral groups but introduces a supplementary supervision of the regulated 
entities.  This supplementary supervision deals with the relations among the single regulated entities 
within the group.   It does not lead to supervision of unregulated entities within a group on a stand-alone 
basis.
39 
B. 
                                                
Financial  Conglomerates 
The Proposed Directive applies directly to certain regulated entities (credit institutions, 
insurance undertakings and investment firms) that have obtained an authorization pursuant to one of the 
sectoral Directives.
40 If such entities are part of a financial conglomerate, they are subject to 
supplementary prudential supervision.
41 In order to determine whether a regulated entity is subject to 
supplementary supervision, two inquiries must be made: first, whether the regulated entity is part of a 
financial conglomerate, and, second, whether the regulated entity is one that is subject to supplementary 
supervision. 
According to the Proposed Directive a financial conglomerate is defined as a group
42 of 
undertakings.  A U.S. observer would say that a group is determined by concepts very similar to the U.S. 
 
37 Art. 6, First Non-Life Insurance Directive, supra note 2 no. (1), and Art. 6, First Life Assurance Directive, supra note 2 no. (2), 
require an authorization of insurance undertakings having established their head office within the territory of a Member State. 
Art. 3(1) in connection with Art. 1(6), Investment Services Directive, supra note 2 no. (6), states that only investment firms 
having their registered office or head office in a Member State are subject to authorization. Although Art. 4, Banking 
Directive, supra note 2 no. (8), provides for the authorization of credit institutions prior to commencement of activities in an 
EU Member State without expressly referring to the origin of that credit institution, it is clear from the context of the Banking 
Directive and Arts. 23 to 25, Banking Directive (governing relations with third countries) that only credit institutions 
established under the laws of a Member State are subject to authorization pursuant to Art. 4, Banking Directive. 
38 If a financial conglomerate is headed by a non-EU entity, the EU-regulated entities are subject to supplementary supervision 
according to Arts. 4(3) & 14, Proposed Directive, see infra part IV.E. 
39 Art. 4(5), Proposed Directive. 
40 See supra note 35. 
41 Art. 1, Proposed Directive. 
42 According to Art. 2(11), Proposed Directive, a group means two or more natural or legal persons between whom there are 
close links.  Pursuant to Art. 2(12), Proposed Directive, close links mean links within the meaning of Art. 1(l), Third Non-Life 
Insurance Directive, supra note 2 no. (3), Art. 1(m), Third Life Assurance Directive, supra note 2 no. (4), Art. 1(15), 
Investment Services Directive, supra note 2 no. (6), or Art. 1(26), Banking Directive, supra note 2 no. (8).  Such a link is 
given in a situation in which two or more natural or legal persons are linked by (a) ‘participation’, which means the ownership 
direct or by way of control of 20% or more of the voting rights or capital of an undertaking, or (b) ‘control’, which means the 
relationship between a parent undertaking and a subsidiary undertaking, in all the cases referred to in Art. 1(1) and (2), 
Consolidated Accounts Directive, see supra note 17, or a similar relationship between any natural or legal person and an 
undertaking.  Close links exist also in the following situations: 
(a)  a situation in which in the opinion of the competent authorities one or more persons effectively exercise a 
dominant influence over another person; 
(b)  a situation in which persons are linked by a participation within the meaning of Art. 17, first sentence, 
Annual Accounts Directive, supra note 17.  There, participation is defined as rights in the capital of other 
undertakings, whether or not represented by certificates, which, by creating a durable link with those 
undertakings, are intended to contribute to the company’s activities; or 
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Bank Holding Company Act concept of control
43 whereby control for purposes of determining a group 
under the Proposed Directive commences with a 20% capital investment.  To qualify as financial 
conglomerate, such group must meet the following conditions:
44  
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
(d) 
                                                                                                                                                            
its activities mainly consist in providing financial services in the 
financial sector,  
it comprises at least one regulated entity that has obtained an 
authorization in accordance with one of the sectoral Directives,
 45 
it comprises at least one insurance or reinsurance undertaking,
46 and at 
least one other entity of a different financial sector and  
whose cross-sectoral activities in the financial sector referred to in (c) 
above are significant.   
When a group is headed by a regulated entity, it qualifies as a financial conglomerate if it 
meets clauses (b) to (d), irrespective of the group’s ratio set out in clause (a).
47 That means that clause (a) 
is only applicable to financial conglomerates that are not headed by a regulated entity.  Clause (b) requires 
a regulated entity with an EU license, clause (c) does not require that the insurance undertaking or other 
entity of a different financial sector has an EU license. 
 
(c)  a situation in which persons are linked by a relationship within the meaning of Art. 12(1), Consolidated 
Accounts Directive.  Such a relationship is given if undertakings are (a) managed on a unified basis pursuant 
to a contract concluded between those undertakings or provisions in the memorandum or articles of 
association of those undertakings or (b) if the administrative, management or supervisory bodies of those 
undertakings consist for the major part of the same persons in office during the financial year and until the 
consolidated accounts are drawn up (such undertakings are not counted if they are connected by a parent-
subsidiary-relation as described in Art. 1(1) or (2), Consolidated Accounts Directive. 
In order to include all relevant groups, no matter how they are structured, a broad definition is used based on the concept of 
“close links” as introduced in the past by the so-called post-BCCI Directive (European Parliament and Council Directive 
95/26/EC of 29 June 1995 amending Directives 77/780/EEC and 89/646/EEC in the field of credit institutions, Directives 
73/239/EEC and 92/49/EEC in the field of non-life insurance, Directives 79/267/EEC and 92/96/EEC in the field of life 
assurance, Directive 93/22/EEC in the field of investment firms and Directive 85/611/EEC in the field of undertakings for 
collective investment in transferable securities (Ucits), with a view to reinforcing prudential supervision, O.J. Eur. Comm. No. 
L 168/7 (1995)). However, the concept of close links has been further elaborated in order to cover other groups of entities 
among which there are no capital links but that are managed on a unified basis and for which accounting legislation gives 
Member States the possibility to require consolidated annual accounts. Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 3, at 5, sub 2, 
Arts. 2 & 3. Clause (c) above captures so-called “horizontal groups” or “horizontal financial conglomerates” that have no 
common parent or capital ties. 
43 Section 2, Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, 12 U.S.C § 1841 (1994 & Supp. V, 2000). 
44 Art. 2(13), Proposed Directive. 
45 Art. 6, First Non-Life Insurance Directive, supra note 2 no. (1); Art. 6, First Life Assurance Directive, supra note 2 no. (2); 
Art. 3(1), Investment Services Directive, supra note 2 no. (6); Art. 4, Banking Directive, supra note 2 no. (8). Such 
authorization is only required for undertakings established under the laws of an EU Member State. See supra note 37. 
46 According to Art. 2(5), Proposed Directive a reinsurance undertaking means a reinsurance undertaking within the meaning of 
Art. 1(c), Insurance Groups Directive, supra note 2 no. (7): an undertaking, other than an insurance undertaking or a non-
member-country insurance undertaking, the main business of which consists in accepting risks ceded by an insurance 
undertaking, a non-member-country insurance undertaking or other reinsurance undertakings. 
47 Art. 3(1), second subparagraph, Proposed Directive. 
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A financial conglomerate therefore must contain at least one insurance or reinsurance 
company and one regulated entity from another sector of the financial industry.  The above definition of a 
financial conglomerate contains two measurement criteria: 
 Clause (a) above requires that the activities of the group mainly consist of 
providing financial services.  This means that the ratio of the consolidated and/or 
aggregated balance sheet total of the regulated and non-regulated financial sector 
entities in the group to the consolidated and/or aggregated balance sheet total of 
the group as a whole, calculated on the basis of the annual accounts, must exceed 
50%.
48 This test intends to distinguish between financial and non-financial 
groups.
49 
 Clause (d) above requires that the cross-sectoral activities in the financial sector 
are significant.  This means that (i) the average of the ratio of the balance sheet 
total of the smallest financial sector to the consolidated and/or aggregated 
balance sheet total of the financial sector entities in the group, calculated on the 
basis of the annual accounts, and (ii) the ratio of the solvency requirements of the 
smallest financial sector to the total solvency requirements of the financial sector 
entities in the group, must exceed 10%.
50  Generally speaking, the size of the 
smallest financial sector must amount to 10% of the total of the financial sector 
entities.  This test intends to distinguish between financial groups with 
homogenous financial activities and financial groups with heterogeneous 
financial activities.
51  The Proposed Directive intends to cover the latter groups, 
the former being covered by the existing sectoral directives
52 on a group-wide 
basis.
53 
The competent authorities
54 of the EU Member States may by common agreement lower 
the ratios of clauses (a) and (d), in particular in the case of groups that are on the borderline of exclusion 
from the definition of financial conglomerate.
55  The competent authorities also may, in a particular case, 
replace the criterion based on balance sheet total with the criterion of income structure or off-balance 
sheet activities or both or add the criterion of income structure or off-balance activities or both to the 
                                                 
48 Art. 3(1), first subparagraph, Proposed Directive.  
49 Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 3, at 5, sub 2, Arts. 2 & 3. 
50 Art. 3(2), first subparagraph, Proposed Directive. According to Art. 3(2), second subparagraph, Proposed Directive, the 
smallest financial sector in a financial conglomerate is the sector with the smallest average. For the purpose of calculating the 
average, the banking sector and the investment services sector are considered together. The solvency requirements are to be 
calculated in accordance with the provisions of the sectoral rules and the Proposed Directive. Id. 
51 Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 3, at 5, sub 2, Arts. 2 & 3. 
52 See supra note 2. 
53 Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 3, at 5, sub 2, Arts. 2 & 3. 
54 Art. 2(15), Proposed Directive defines competent authorities as the national authorities of the EU Member State which are 
empowered by law or regulation to supervise credit institutions, and/or insurance undertakings and/or investment firms. Thus, 
the Proposed Directive does not introduce a new authority but provides cooperation between the existing national supervising 
authorities, see infra part IV.D. 
55 Art. 3(3)(b), Proposed Directive. 
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criterion based on balance sheet total, if the competent authorities are of the opinion that these parameters 
are of particular relevance.
56  
The Proposed Directive introduces and defines the term mixed financial holding 
company
57 to cover financial conglomerates headed by a non-regulated entity holding company.  The 
definition does not require that mixed financial holding companies must have their head office in the EU.  
However, if a financial conglomerate headed by a mixed financial holding company is to be covered 
directly by the Proposed Directive, the mixed financial holding company must be located in the EU.
58 
                                                 
56 Art. 3(3)(c), Proposed Directive.  According to Art. 3(3)(a), Proposed Directive, the competent authority may exclude a 
particular entity from the calculation of ratios under the same conditions under which a competent authority responsible for 
exercising supplemental supervision may exclude an entity from supplemental supervision pursuant to Art. 5(4), Proposed 
Directive.  See infra part IV.A. 
57 Art. 2(14), Proposed Directive defines mixed financial holding company as a parent undertaking, other than a regulated entity, 
which, together with its subsidiaries, of which at least one is a regulated entity having its head office in the EU, and other 
entities, constitutes a financial conglomerate. 
58 See Art. 4(2)(b), Proposed Directive. Financial conglomerates that are headed by a non-EU company (a regulated entity or a 
mixed financial holding company) are covered by Arts. 4(3) & 14, Proposed Directive, see infra part IV.E. 
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Financial Conglomerates: 
Group must be mainly engaged in financial activities. 
 
1.   Regulated Entity Holding Company 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.   Non-Regulated Entity Holding Company 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.   Horizontal Conglomerate 
 
 
 
Regulated Entity 
Holding Company 
(Re-/Insurance Company) 
Credit Institution/ 
Investment Firm 
Re-/Insurance 
Company 
Non-Regulated Entity 
Holding Company 
(Mixed Financial 
Holding Company) 
Re-/Insurance 
Company 
Re-/Insurance 
Company 
Credit Institution/ 
Investment Firm 
Relationship 
(Art. 12(1), 
Consolidated Accounts 
Directive) 
Credit Institution/
Investment Firm 
Regulated Entity  
Holding Company 
(Credit Institution/ 
Investment Firm) 
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It is noteworthy that a financial conglomerate does not exist if a group is composed only 
of credit institutions and investment firms.  However, the permitted activities of an investment firm are 
substantially overlapping with the permitted activities of a financial institution.  Thus, in most – if not all 
– cases, an investment firm owning 20% or more of a credit institution or a credit institution owning more 
than 20% of an investment firm is covered by the current rules on consolidated supervision of credit 
institutions and financial institutions.  For instance, the rules on consolidated supervision of the German 
banking law apply to financial institutions and investment firms.
59 Consolidated supervision always 
requires the existence of a deposit-taking institution in the group. 
From the U.S. experience, it is surprising that conglomerates that are headed by a non-
regulated entity holding company are subject to supplementary supervision only if the group is mainly 
engaged in financial services in the financial sector, i.e., banking, insurance or investment services.  
However, the Proposed Directive goes further than current rules on consolidated supervision.  The current 
rules require consolidated supervision for credit institutions that are subsidiaries of a credit institution or 
of a financial holding company, i.e., a company the subsidiaries of which are exclusively or mainly credit 
institutions or financial institutions and that has at least one credit institution subsidiary.
60 Consolidated 
supervision does not extend to a “mixed-activity holding company”, which is defined as a parent 
company other than a financial holding company or a credit institution, the subsidiaries of which include 
at least one credit institution.
61 Thus, the proverbial steel company that acquires a bank is not subject to 
consolidated supervision under current EU law because it is not a financial holding company.
62 However, 
the steel company that acquires a bank and an insurance company, both together being larger than the 
steel company, would be a mixed financial holding company of a financial conglomerate and be subject 
to supplementary supervision under the Proposed Directive.   A holding company without its own 
business activities whose principal activity consists of acquiring holdings in industrial and financial 
companies is a financial institution
63 and if the subsidiaries of such financial institution mainly consist of 
credit institutions or financial institutions,
64 it is a financial holding company and subject to consolidated 
supervision.
65 If the subsidiaries do not mainly consist of credit or financial institutions, it is not a 
financial holding company subject to consolidated supervision.  If the above holding company holds a 
credit institution and an insurance company and if its activities mainly consist of providing financial 
services, it is a mixed financial holding company and is also subject to supplementary supervision.  If its 
activities do not consist mainly of providing financial services, it is neither subject to consolidated nor to 
supplementary supervision. 
                                                 
59 See the discussion of consolidated supervision in Germany in Michael Gruson, Banking Regulation and Treatment of Foreign 
Banks in Germany, Chapter 8, §§ 8.20-8.25 in 2 REGULATION OF FOREIGN BANKS, UNITED STATES AND INTERNATIONAL 
(Michael Gruson & Ralph Reisner eds., 3d ed. 2000), at 425-446. Investment firms in the meaning of the Investment Services 
Directive, supra note 2 no. (6), may be covered by consolidated supervision as part of a banking group (Institutsgruppe) (§ 
10a(2), KWG, supra note 16, because they are financial service institutions (Finanzdienstleistungsinstitute, defined in § 1(1a), 
KWG) or they may be part of a financial holding group (Finanzholding Gruppe) (§ 10a(3), first sentence, KWG) because they 
are financial enterprises (Finanzunternehmen, defined in § 1(3), KWG). 
60 Art. 52(2), Banking Directive, supra note 2 no. (8). See supra note 19. 
61 Art. 1(22), Banking Directive, supra note 2 no. (8).  
62 See supra note 20. 
63 See supra note 16. 
64 See supra note 20. 
65 Id.  
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The non-regulated entity holding company that is the parent of a financial conglomerate 
must always be a mixed financial holding company, i.e., it must have at least one EU-regulated entity 
subsidiary that has its head office in the EU.
66 
C. 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
                                                
Undertakings in the Financial Conglomerates that are Subject to Supplementary 
Supervision 
The Proposed Directive does not envision that the whole financial conglomerate or all 
companies in the financial conglomerate are subject to supplementary supervision.  It requires that only 
the following undertakings that are part of a financial conglomerate are subject to supplementary 
supervision in addition to the supervision pursuant to the applicable sectoral rules:
67 
every EU-regulated entity which is at the head of a financial 
conglomerate, 
every EU-regulated entity, the parent undertaking
68 of which is a mixed 
financial holding company having its head office in the EU, and 
every EU-regulated entity in a financial conglomerate linked to another 
entity by a relationship within the meaning of Art. 12(1), Consolidated 
Accounts Directive,
69 i.e., every regulated entity in a horizontal financial 
conglomerate.
70 
As stated above,
71 each regulated entity subject to supplementary supervision must have 
its head office in the EU and the mixed financial holding company heading a financial conglomerate must 
have its head office in the EU and such financial conglomerate must have at least one subsidiary that is a 
regulated entity with its head office in the EU.
72 However, even in the case of a mixed financial holding 
 
66 Arts. 1(14) & 4(2)(b), Proposed Directive.  If the parent were not a mixed financial holding company, its regulated entity 
subsidiaries would not be subject to supplementary supervision.  Id.  
Note that the Tripartite Report, supra note 5, at 36, sub no. 97, defines mixed conglomerates quite differently as those groups 
which are predominantly commercially or industrially oriented, but contain at least one regulated financial entity (which is 
more than merely a “captive” entity doing business only on behalf of the group) in some part of their corporate structure. 
Typically, mixed conglomerates would be headed by a commercial or industrial company (or by an unregulated non-financial 
holding company) with the regulated entities embedded downstream in the group structure. The Proposed Directive does not 
address the issue of such mixed conglomerates.  See Tripartite Report at 36-38, sub nos. 97-103.   
67 Art. 4(1) & (2), Proposed Directive. It follows from Art. 4(2), Proposed Directive in connection with Art. 4(1) Proposed 
Directive (“regulated entities referred to in Article 1”) and in connection with Art. 1, Proposed Directive (“… regulated entities 
which have obtained an authorization pursuant to …”) that the regulated entities referred to in (a) to (c) are regulated entities 
which have their registered office or head office in the EU. See supra note 37. 
68 According to Art. 2(8), Proposed Directive, a parent undertaking means a parent undertaking within the meaning of Art. 1, 
Consolidated Accounts Directive, see supra note 17, and, in addition, any undertaking which, in the opinion of the competent 
authorities, effectively exercises a dominant influence over another undertaking.   
69 Supra note 17. 
70 See supra note 42, sub (c). Such a relationship between two entities exists when the entities are managed on a unified basis 
pursuant to a contract or when the administrative, management or supervisory bodies of such entities consist for the major part 
of the same persons in office. 
71 See supra notes 37 & 67. 
72 Art. 2(14), Proposed Directive. 
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company having its head office in the EU, not the mixed financial holding company but the EU regulated 
entity subsidiaries are subject to supplementary supervision.  If the parent undertaking of an EU-regulated 
entity is a regulated entity having its head office outside the EU or a mixed financial holding company 
having its head office outside the EU, Art. 14, Proposed Directive applies.
73 
Where a financial conglomerate is a subgroup of another financial conglomerate (the 
main financial conglomerate), Member States may apply the provisions of Arts. 5 to 13, Proposed 
Directive (supplementary supervision) only to the main financial conglomerate and not to the subgroup.
74 
It appears that the non-financial activities of a mixed financial holding company could have the effect that 
the group headed by the mixed financial holding company does not meet the financial conglomerate tests.  
In that case, one has to determine whether the non-qualifying group comprises subgroups that qualify as 
financial conglomerates.
75 
The Proposed Directive gives the competent authorities discretion to enlarge the group of 
entities subject to supplementary supervision beyond the entities described in Art. 4(2) and (3), Proposed 
Directive:
76 where persons hold participations or capital ties in one or more regulated entities or exercise 
significant influence over such entities without holding a participation or capital ties, although the 
conditions of Art. 4(2) or (3) are not met, the competent authorities shall determine whether and to what 
extent these entities together with other entities constitute a financial conglomerate and supplementary 
supervision is to be carried out to the regulated entities.
77 
It is somewhat confusing that the existence of a financial conglomerate is determined by 
the existence of financial and other control relationships (close links) and that the determination of those 
regulated entities in a financial conglomerate that are subject to supplementary supervision is also 
determined by the existence of (other) financial and capital relationships.  The Commission did not 
choose to use a uniform concept to determine the relation between entities that would subject such entities 
to supplementary supervision, such as the use of the simple but flexible concept of control of the U.S. 
Bank Holding Company Act of 1956.
78 
                                                 
73 Art. 4(3), Proposed Directive. See Art. 14, Proposed Directive discussed infra part IV.E. 
74 Art. 4(2), second subparagraph, Proposed Directive. 
75 The prohibition of separate regulation of subgroups set forth in Art. 4(2), second subparagraph, Proposed Directive does not 
apply in that case because the subgroup is not a subgroup of another financial conglomerate. 
76 Art. 4(3), Proposed Directive is discussed infra part IV.E. 
77 Art. 4(4), Proposed Directive. The Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 3, at 6, sub 2, Art. 4, states:  
As some groups are not covered by the definitions under Art. 2, but do have financial entities with substantial activities 
in the financial markets the supervision of which would respond to the objectives of the Directive, the Directive 
introduces a basis for competent authorities to submit also these special group structures to supplementary supervision, 
on the condition that well defined conditions are met. 
78 See Section 2(a), Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a) (1999); Michael Gruson, Nonbanking and 
Financial Activities of Foreign Banks Operating in the United States, Chapter 10, §§ 10.05, 10.06, in 1 REGULATION OF 
FOREIGN BANKS, UNITED STATES AND INTERNATIONAL (Michael Gruson and Ralph Reisner eds., 3d ed. 2000), at 688-736.  
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In order to avoid possible moral hazards, the Proposed Directive states that the inclusion 
of unregulated entities or third-country regulated entities in the group-wide supplementary supervision 
does not mean that these entities are subject to supervision on a stand-alone basis.
79 
IV. 
A. 
                                                
Supplementary  Supervision 
The Proposed Directive introduces a series of rules with regard to the supplementary 
supervision of regulated entities in a financial conglomerate.  They relate in particular to capital 
adequacy,
80 intra-group transactions and risk concentration,
81 and to the management.
82 The Proposed 
Directive also requires Member States of the EU to ensure that for each financial conglomerate the 
competent authority of one Member State is designated to coordinate between the supervisors involved in 
the group-wide supervision.  The competent authorities are also required to cooperate and exchange 
information.
83 
It must be emphasized that supplementary supervision does not mean supervision on a 
consolidated basis like the supervision provided by the sectoral rules.  The Proposed Directive follows a 
so-called “solo-plus” approach to supervision.  The basis of supervision is the supervision of individual 
group entities on a solo basis by their respective regulators.  The solo supervision of individual entities is 
complemented by a general quantitative assessment of the group as a whole and, usually, by a quantitative 
group-wide assessment of the adequacy of capital.
84 The Proposed Directive does not require any 
additional consolidation of the accounts of the financial conglomerate as a whole if such consolidation is 
not imposed by existing EU Directives.   
Capital  Adequacy 
One of the most important issues of the supervision of financial conglomerates is the 
supervision of the financial condition of the group.  Therefore, the competent authorities are required to 
exercise a supplementary supervision on the capital adequacy of the regulated entities in a financial 
conglomerate in accordance with Annex I of the Proposed Directive.
85 The major goal of such 
supplementary group-wide capital adequacy requirements is to eliminate any inappropriate intra-group 
creation of own funds such as double or multiple gearing
86 or excessive leverage.
87 In such situations the 
 
79 Art. 4(5), Proposed Directive. See Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 3, at 6, sub 2, Art. 4, and Tripartite Report, supra 
note 5, at 36, sub no. 96 (the impression that the activities of unregulated entities in the financial conglomerate are in some 
way being monitored or supervised, even if only informally, creates a moral hazard). 
80 Art. 5, Proposed Directive.  
81 Art. 6, Proposed Directive. 
82 Arts. 18(1), 19(1), 23(1) and 25(2), Proposed Directive. 
83 Arts. 7 to 13, Proposed Directive. 
84 Tripartite Report, supra note 5, at 17, sub no. 43. 
85 Art. 5(1), Proposed Directive. 
86 According to the Joint Forum Report, supra note 5, at 8, Capital Adequacy Principles Paper, sub no. 18, double gearing occurs 
whenever one entity holds regulatory capital issued by another entity within the same group and the issuer is allowed to count 
the capital in its own balance sheet; multiple gearing occurs when the dependant in the previous instance itself downstreams 
regulatory capital to a third-tier entity, and the parent’s externally generated capital is geared up a third time. 
87 Annex I, sub I, 2(i), Proposed Directive. See Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 3, at 4, sub 1(b). The Joint Forum Report, 
supra note 5, at 9, Capital Adequacy Principles Paper, sub no. 23, defines excessive leverage as situations where a parent 
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same own funds are used simultaneously as a buffer more than once, i.e., to cover the capital 
requirements of the parent company as well as those of a subsidiary (and possibly also those of a 
subsidiary of a subsidiary).
88 Thus, the competent authorities must require regulated entities in a financial 
conglomerate to provide own funds at the level of the financial conglomerate that are always at least 
equal to the capital adequacy requirements as calculated in accordance with Annex I.
89 In addition, certain 
entities in the financial conglomerate that on a stand-alone basis may not be subject to capital adequacy 
requirements must be included for its purpose of calculating capital adequacy at the level of the financial 
conglomerate.
90 
The solvency requirements for each separate financial sector represented in a financial 
conglomerate continues to be covered by own funds elements in accordance with the corresponding 
sectoral rules.
91 Only own funds elements that are eligible according to each of the sectoral rules (cross-
                                                                                                                                                             
issues debt (or other instruments not acceptable as regulatory capital in the downstream entity) and downstreams the proceeds 
as equity or other forms of regulatory capital to its regular subsidiaries. 
88 Tripartite Report, supra note 5, at 17, sub no. 44. 
89 Art. 5(2), first subparagraph, Proposed Directive.  
90 Art. 5(3), Proposed Directive states that “[f]or the purpose of calculating the capital adequacy requirements…, the following 
entities shall be included in the scope of supervision”:  
(a)  financial holding companies within the meaning of Art. 7(3), first indent, Capital Adequacy Directive, as 
amended by Art. 22, first indent, Proposed Directive, i.e., financial institutions the subsidiary undertakings of 
which are either exclusively or mainly investment firms or other financial institutions at least one of which is 
an investment firm and which is not a mixed financial holding company within the meaning of the Proposed 
Directive;  
(b)  mixed activity holding companies within the meaning of Art. 7(3), second indent, Capital Adequacy 
Directive, as amended by Art. 22, second indent, Proposed Directive, i.e., parent undertakings, other than 
financial holding companies or investment firms or mixed financial holding companies within the meaning of 
the Proposed Directive, the subsidiaries of which include at least one investment firm; 
(c)  related undertakings of an insurance undertaking within the meaning of Art. 3(2), first indent, in connection 
with Art. 1(h), Insurance Groups Directive, supra note 2 no. (7), i.e., subsidiaries of insurance undertakings 
or other undertakings in which a participation is held by insurance undertakings;  
(d)  participating undertakings in insurance undertakings within the meaning of Art. 3(2), second indent, in 
connection with Art. 1(g), Insurance Groups Directive, i.e., parent undertakings of insurance undertakings or 
other undertakings holding a participation in insurance undertakings;  
(e)  related undertakings of a participating undertaking in an insurance undertaking within the meaning of Arts. 
3(2), third indent, 5, 6, 8, 9 & 10, Insurance Groups Directive, i.e., “sister undertakings” of an insurance 
undertaking;  
(f)  credit institutions within the meaning of Art. 1(1), second subparagraph, Banking Directive, supra note 2 no. 
(8), i.e., any private or public undertakings which correspond to the definition in Art. 1(1), first paragraph, 
Banking Directive, and which have been authorized in a third country (see supra note 15);  
(g)  financial institutions within the meaning of Art. 1(5), Banking Directive (see supra note 16); and 
(h)  ancillary banking services undertakings within the meaning of Art. 1(23), Banking Directive, i.e., 
undertakings the principal activity of which consists in owning or managing property, managing data-
processing services, or any other similar activity which is ancillary to the principal activity of one or more 
credit institutions. 
   The solvency requirements for non-regulated financial sector entities that are not included in the sectoral solvency requirement 
computation are computed on a notational basis.  Notional solvency requirement means the capital requirement such an entity 
would have to comply with according to the relevant sectoral rules if it were a regulated entity of that particular financial 
sector; a mixed financial holding company shall be treated according to the sectoral rules of the most important financial sector 
in the financial conglomerate.  Annex I, sub I, 2(ii), last paragraph, Proposed Directive.  
91 Annex I, sub I, 2(ii), Proposed Directive. 
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sector capital) shall qualify for the verification of the compliance with additional solvency requirements 
at the financial conglomerate level.
92  
Annex I sets forth three different methods for calculating the solvency position on the 
level of a financial conglomerate.  Although the Proposed Directive is not clear in this respect, it is 
intended that the competent authorities have the choice as to which method they apply to a financial 
conglomerate and they may also apply a combination of the three methods.
93 These methods are: 
1.  Method 1: “Accounting Consolidation” Method 
Method 1 uses the consolidated accounts as a basis for calculating the supplementary 
capital adequacy. Thus, it is only applicable for consolidated groups.  According to this method, the 
supplementary capital adequacy shall be calculated as the difference between: 
(i)  the own funds of the financial conglomerate calculated on the basis of 
the consolidated position of the group;
94 
and 
(ii)  the sum of the solvency requirements for each different financial sector 
represented in the group.
95 
Formula for calculating the supplementary capital adequacy according to method 1: 
 
Supp.CA = OFConsolidated - (SBank + SInsurance + SInvestment + SNon-Regulated)
96 
 
The difference shall not be negative.
97 
Because of the fact that this method takes as its starting point and basis the fully 
consolidated accounts of the financial conglomerate, by definition, all intra-group on- and off-balance 
sheet accounts or exposures have been eliminated and the effects of double or multiple gearing and 
                                                 
92 Id. 
93 Annex I, sub II, Method 4, Proposed Directive. See also Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee, supra note 13, at 2, 
sub 2.5 and at 4, sub 3.9; Report of the European Parliament’s Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, supra note 12, 
at 34. 
94 The elements eligible are those that qualify in accordance with the relevant sectoral rules, Annex I, sub II, Method 1(i), 
Proposed Directive. 
95 The solvency requirements for each different financial sector are calculated in accordance with the relevant sectoral rules, 
Annex I, sub II, Method 1(ii), Proposed Directive. In the case of non-regulated financial sector entities that are not included in 
the sectoral solvency requirement calculations, a notional solvency requirement shall be calculated. Id.  See supra note 90. 
96 Supp.CA shall mean the supplementary capital adequacy, i.e., the surplus or deficit of the group-wide capital, OF shall mean 
own funds, and S shall mean the solvency requirements of a financial sector. 
97 Annex I, sub II, Method 1, ultimate paragraph, Proposed Directive. If the difference is negative, the group faces a capital 
deficit. 
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excessive leverage are equated.  Thus, calculating the group-wide capital adequacy simply consists in the 
deduction of the solvency requirements of the group’s sectors from the consolidated own funds. 
2.  Method 2: “Deduction and Aggregation” Method 
The calculation of the supplementary capital adequacy pursuant to method 2 is carried 
out on the basis of the single accounts of each entity in the group.  According to this method, the 
supplementary capital adequacy shall be calculated on the basis of the accounts of each of the entities in 
the group as the difference between: 
(i)  the sum of the own funds of each regulated and non-regulated entity in 
the financial conglomerate;
98 
and 
(ii)  the sum of: 
  -  the solvency requirements for each regulated and non-regulated 
entity in the group
99; and 
-  the book value of the participations in other entities of the 
group.
100 
Formula for calculating the supplementary capital adequacy according to method 2: 
Supp.CA = (OF1 + OF2 + OF3 + …) –  
[(S1 + S2 + S3 + …) + (BV1 + BV2 + BV3 …)]
101 
The difference shall not be negative.
102 
The effect of this method is to pretend the situation of consolidated accounts and 
therefore to eliminate multiple gearing, excessive leverage and the misuse of accounting margins 
relating to the book value of participations by deducting those participations. 
                                                 
98 The elements eligible are those that qualify in accordance with the relevant sectoral rules, Annex I, sub II, Method 2(i), 
Proposed Directive. 
99 The solvency requirements shall be calculated in accordance with the relevant sectoral rules, Annex I, sub II, Method 2(ii), 
Proposed Directive. In the case of non-regulated entities, a notional solvency requirement shall be calculated, Id.  See supra 
note 90. 
100 Although the wording in this point is not very clear, participations in other entities of the group means any participation that 
is held within the group, e.g., participations of the parent in its subsidiaries or cross-participations of the subsidiaries. See Joint 
Forum Report, supra note 5, at 9, Capital Adequacy Principles Paper, sub no. 20. 
101 Supp.CA shall mean the supplementary capital adequacy, i.e., the surplus or deficit of the group-wide capital, OF shall mean 
own funds, S shall mean the solvency requirements of an entity of the group and BV shall mean the book value of a 
participation. 
102 Annex I, sub II, Method 2, ultimate paragraph, Proposed Directive. If the difference is negative, the group faces a capital 
deficit. 
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3.  Method 3: “Requirement Deduction” Method 
Method 3 is based on the balance sheet of each company within the group.  According to 
this method, the calculation of the supplementary capital adequacy shall be carried out on the basis of the 
accounts of each of the entities in the group as the difference between: 
(i)  the own funds of the parent undertaking or the entity at the head of the 
financial conglomerate;
103 
and 
(ii)  the sum of 
-  the solvency requirement of the parent undertaking or the head 
referred to in clause (i); and 
-  the higher of the book value of the parent undertaking’s 
participation in other entities in the group and these entities’ 
solvency requirement.
104 
Formula for calculating the supplementary capital adequacy according to method 3: 
Supp.CA = OFParent – [SParent + (BV1 or S1 + BV2 or S2 + BV3 or S3 + …)]
105 
The difference shall not be negative.
106 
The competent authorities shall require regulated entities to have in place adequate 
capital adequacy policies at the level of the financial conglomerate, as well as appropriate internal control 
mechanisms as regards capital adequacy.
107 For the purpose of calculating the capital adequacy 
requirements, the competent authorities responsible for exercising supplementary supervision may decide 
not to include a particular entity in the following cases:
108 
                                                 
103 The elements eligible are those that qualify in accordance with the relevant sectoral rules, Annex I, sub II, Method 3(i), 
Proposed Directive. 
104 The solvency requirements of the parent undertaking shall be taken into account for their proportional share in accordance 
with Annex I, sub I, Proposed Directive. Annex I, sub II, Method 3(ii), Proposed Directive. In the case of non-regulated 
entities, a notional solvency requirement shall be calculated. Id.  See supra note 90. 
105 Supp.CA shall mean the supplementary capital adequacy, i.e., the surplus or deficit of the group-wide capital, OF shall mean 
the own funds of the parent undertaking on the basis of the single account, S shall mean the solvency requirements and BV 
shall mean the book value of the parent’s participation. 
106 Annex I, sub II, Method 3, ultimate paragraph, Proposed Directive. If the difference is negative, the group faces a capital 
deficit. 
107 Art. 5(2), second subparagraph, Proposed Directive. 
108 Art. 5(4), Proposed Directive. 
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(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
B. 
                                                
if the entity is situated in a third country where there are legal 
impediments to the transfer of the necessary information;
109 
if the entity is of negligible interest with respect to the objective of the 
supplementary supervision of regulated entities in a financial 
conglomerate;
110 or 
if the inclusion of the entity would be inappropriate or misleading with 
respect to the objectives of supplementary supervision. 
If the capital adequacy position at the level of the financial conglomerate falls below the 
requirements, if the capital adequacy policies are not adequate, if the internal control mechanisms are not 
appropriate, or where the requirements are met but the solvency may nevertheless be jeopardized,
111 the 
competent authorities responsible for the supervision of the regulated entities in the financial 
conglomerate must ensure that the necessary measures to rectify the situation are taken by the entities in 
the group as soon as possible.
112 
Intra-Group Transactions and Risk Concentration 
Another core regulation of the Proposed Directive is the requirement of supplementary 
supervision on intra-group transactions
113 and risk concentration
114 of regulated entities in a financial 
conglomerate.
115  
 
109 This exception must be without prejudice to the sectoral rules regarding the obligation of competent authorities to refuse 
authorization where the effective exercise of their supervisory functions is prevented. Art. 5(4)(a), Proposed Directive. 
110 If several entities are intended to be excluded because of such negligible interest, they must be nevertheless included when 
collectively they are of non-negligible interest. Art. 5(4), second subparagraph, Proposed Directive. 
111 The requirements are set forth in Art. 5(2), first subparagraph, Proposed Directive. 
112 Art. 5(5), Proposed Directive. 
113 According to Art. 2(16), Proposed Directive, intra-group transactions mean all transactions by which regulated entities within 
a financial conglomerate rely either directly or indirectly upon other entities within the same group for the fulfillment of an 
obligation, whether or not contractual, whether or not for payment. 
According to the Joint Forum, supra note 5, in its Report on Intra-Group Transaction and Exposure Principles (Basle, Dec. 
1999), amending the Report on Supervision of Financial Conglomerates, at 2, sub no. 4, intra-group transactions and 
exposures take the form of direct and indirect claims between entities within a financial conglomerate. They can originate in a 
variety of ways, for example, through: (a) cross shareholdings, (b) trading operations whereby one group company deals with, 
or on behalf of, another group company, (c) central management of short-term liquidity within the conglomerate, (d) 
guarantees, loans and commitments provided to, or received from, other companies in the group, (e) the provision of 
management and other service arrangements, e.g., pension arrangements or back office services, (f) exposures to major 
shareholders (including loans and off-balance sheet exposures such as commitments and guarantees), (g) exposures arising 
through the placement of client assets with other group companies, (h) purchase or sales of assets with other group companies, 
(i) transfer of risk through reinsurance, and (j) transactions to shift third party-related risk exposures between entities within 
the conglomerate. 
114 According to Art. 2(17), Proposed Directive, risk concentration means all exposures with a loss potential borne by entities 
within a financial conglomerate, which are large enough to threaten the solvency or the financial position in general of the 
regulated entities in the financial conglomerate, and which exposures may be caused by counterparty risk/credit risk, 
investment risk, insurance risk, market risk, other risks, or a combination or interaction of these risks. 
Pursuant to the Joint Forum, supra note 5, in its Report on Risk Concentrations Principles (Basle, Dec. 1999), amending the 
Report on Supervision of Financial Conglomerates, at 2, sub no. 4, risk concentration can take many forms, including 
exposures to: (a) individual counterparties, (b) groups of individual counterparties or related entities, (c) counterparties in 
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Intra-group transactions may cause supervisory concerns when they (i) result in capital or 
income being inappropriately transferred from the regulated entity, (ii) are on terms or under 
circumstances which parties operating at arm’s length would not allow and may be disadvantageous to a 
regulated entity, (iii) can adversely affect the solvency, the liquidity and the profitability of individual 
entities within a group, or (iv) are used as a means of supervisory arbitrage, thereby evading capital or 
other regulatory requirements altogether.
116 Monitoring intra-group transactions is also an important 
factor in dealing with the risk of contagion within a financial conglomerate.  Contagion entails the risk 
that, if certain parts of a conglomerate are experiencing financial difficulties, they may infect other 
healthy parts of the conglomerate as a result of which the operation of the healthy parts may be hampered 
or even made impossible.
117 Therefore, intra-group transactions can significantly exacerbate problems for 
a regulated entity once contagion spreads.
118 
As to the problem of risk concentration, supervisors of the different financial sectors use 
various approaches to monitor large exposures, due to the different risks they are facing.
119 In all three 
sectors, financial institutions face an increased risk of loss when their assets, liabilities or business 
activities are not diversified.
120 As not all risk concentrations are inherently bad (a certain degree of 
concentration is the inevitable result of a well-articulated business strategy as well as product 
specialization, the targeting of a customer base or a sound strategy of outsourcing data processing 
activities), supervisors need to balance the benefits against the risks of concentrations at the conglomerate 
level.
121 In identifying risks, the competent authorities have to take into account the different ways in 
which large losses can develop in a conglomerate as a result of risk concentration.
122   
                                                                                                                                                             
specific geographical locations, (d) industry sectors, (e) specific products, (f) service providers, e.g., back office services, and 
(g) natural disasters or catastrophes. 
115 Art. 6(1), in connection with Annex II, Proposed Directive. 
116 Joint Forum Report on Intra-Group Transactions and Exposure Principles, supra note 113, at 6, sub no. 12. See also Tripartite 
Report, supra note 5, at 21, sub no. 55. 
117 Tripartite Report, supra note 5, at 18, sub no. 47. 
118 Tripartite Report, supra note 5, at 19, sub no. 50. 
119 See Joint Forum Report on Risk Concentrations Principles, supra note 114, at 4 & 5, sub nos. 8–10. 
120 Joint Forum Report on Risk Concentrations Principles, supra note 114, at 5, sub no. 11. 
121 Joint Forum Report on Risk Concentrations Principles, supra note 4, at 7, sub nos. 22 & 23.  
122 Joint Forum Report on Risk Concentrations Principles, supra note 114, at 7, sub no. 23. The Report addresses some of them as 
follows: 
 Losses at the conglomerate level can reflect the aggregate of losses on similar types of exposures (e.g., bonds, 
loans and investments with the same obligor) across the sectors.  
 Losses could reflect risk factors that have consequences for different types of exposures in different entities 
(e.g., a natural disaster could cause insurance loses in a conglomerate’s insurance operation and credit losses 
in its banking operation if both offered products in the affected region). 
 Losses could reflect the interaction of risk factors (e.g., the loss potential in a derivative or exchange rate 
contract resulting from an exchange rate depreciation may be intensified if the same price movement 
adversely affects the repayment ability of a counterparty or the financial stability of the counterparty’s 
country of residence). 
 Losses could also reflect the breakdown of previously observed correlations, such as occurs in a flight to 
quality in which all risky assets decline in value, where previously many of them were measured to be 
uncorrelated. 
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To avoid the risks resulting from intra-group transactions and risk concentration, the EU 
Member States or the competent authorities shall require regulated entities to have in place within the 
financial conglomerate adequate risk management processes and internal control mechanisms, including 
sound reporting and accounting procedures, in order to identify, measure, monitor and control the intra-
group transactions within a financial conglomerate and the risk concentration at the level of the financial 
conglomerate.
123 However, the Proposed Directive does not provide for quantitative limits or standards 
with regard to intra-group transactions within a financial conglomerate and risk concentration at the level 
of the financial conglomerate.  The introduction of such limits or the introduction of other supervisory 
measures that would achieve similar objectives is left to the EU Member States.
124 
In addition, the Member States or the competent authorities shall require regulated 
entities or mixed financial holding companies to report on a regular basis and at least annually to the 
competent authority responsible for the supplementary supervision all significant intra-group transactions 
within the financial conglomerate as well as any significant risk concentration at the level of the financial 
conglomerate.
125 The intra-group transactions and risk concentrations shall be subject to supervisory 
overview by the competent authorities responsible for supplementary supervision.
126 Therefore, the co-
ordinator
127 and the competent authorities responsible for sectoral group-wide supervision of the regulated 
entities in a financial conglomerate shall identify and agree with each other on the type of transactions 
and risks regulated entities in a particular financial conglomerate shall report in accordance with the 
provisions on reporting of intra-group transactions and risk concentration.
128 Thus, the Proposed Directive 
provides for the development of reporting requirements that are specific for each financial conglomerate. 
When a financial conglomerate is headed by a mixed financial holding company, the 
sectoral rules regarding intra-group transactions and risk concentration of the largest financial sector in 
the financial conglomerate shall apply to the financial conglomerate as a whole, including the mixed 
financial holding company.
129 
The Proposed Directive gives the competent authorities responsible for the supervision of 
the regulated entities in the financial conglomerate the authority to enforce compliance with the rules on 
intra-group transactions and risk concentration against such regulated entities and, where appropriate, 
against other entities in the group.
130  Where the intra-group transactions or risk concentrations are a 
                                                 
123 Art. 6(2), Proposed Directive. According to the second paragraph of Annex II, Proposed Directive, the competent authorities 
responsible for supplementary supervision shall in particular monitor the possible risk of contagion in the financial 
conglomerate, the risk of a conflict of interests, the risk of circumvention of sectoral rules, and the level of volume of risks. 
124 Art. 6(4), Proposed Directive. 
125 Art. 6(3), Proposed Directive, in connection with Annex II, Proposed Directive. 
126 Id. 
127 See infra IV D for a discussion of the co-ordinator. 
128 Annex II, first paragraph, Proposed Directive referring to the reporting provision of Art. 6(3), Proposed Directive. When 
defining the type of transactions and risks, the relevant competent authorities shall take into account the specific group and risk 
management structure of the financial conglomerate. In particular, the relevant competent authorities shall define appropriate 
thresholds based on regulatory own funds and/or technical provisions. Id. 
129 Art. 6(5), Proposed Directive. According to the wording of Art. 6(5), Proposed Directive the sectoral rules of the largest sector 
in the financial conglomerate shall apply “to that [largest] sector”. However, that does not seem to make sense. Art. 6(5) 
probably means that the sectoral rules of the largest sector shall apply to the whole group. 
130 Art. 6(6), first subparagraph, Proposed Directive. 
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threat to the regulated entities’ financial position, the competent authorities shall take appropriate 
measures.
131  
In the banking sector, the Proposed Directive proposes some amendments concerning 
intra-group transactions.  The Proposed Directive would amend the Banking Directive
132 to provide that, 
where the parent undertaking of one or more credit institutions is a mixed-activity holding company, the 
competent authorities responsible for the supervision of these credit institutions shall exercise general 
supervision over transactions between the credit institution and the mixed-activity holding company and 
its subsidiaries.
133 In addition, the competent authorities must require credit institutions to have in place 
adequate risk management processes and internal control mechanisms, including sound reporting and 
accounting procedures, in order to identify, measure, monitor and control transactions with their parent 
mixed-activity holding company and its subsidiaries appropriately.
134 The proposed amendment to the 
Banking Directive does not establish objective standards for the permissibility of intra-group 
transactions.
135 
C. 
D. 
                                                
Management  Qualifications 
The Proposed Directive provides that, in the case where the business of an insurance 
undertaking, life insurance undertaking, investment firm or a credit institution is co-directed by persons 
appointed in a different legal entity or where persons appointed in a different legal entity have a material 
influence on the direction of the insurance undertaking, life insurance undertaking, investment firm or 
credit institution, those persons have to prove sufficient good repute and appropriate professional 
qualifications or experience to perform their duties.
136 These provisions are intended to ensure that a 
manager or co-director of a non-regulated entity having a dominant influence on the performance of a 
regulated entity is reliable like a manager of the regulated entity.  This provision responds to the recent 
tendency to manage financial conglomerates along the different business lines of conglomerates instead 
of the traditional legal entity based approaches.
137 
Measures to Facilitate Supplementary Supervision 
As mentioned above, one of the principal objectives of the Proposed Directive is the 
introduction of measures to facilitate supplementary supervision.
138 Supplementary supervision requires 
 
131 Art. 6(6), second subparagraph, Proposed Directive. 
132 Supra note 2 no. (8). 
133 Art. 25(7), Proposed Directive, proposing to add a new Art. 55a to the Banking Directive, supra note 2 no. (8). 
134 Id. 
135 See, e.g.,  23A & 23B, Federal Reserve Act, 12 U.S.C, 371c & 371c-1 (1994 & Supp. V 2000). New Art. 55a, Banking 
Directive, supra note 2 no. (8), proposed to be added by Art. 25(7), Proposed Directive, provides that where the intra-group 
transactions are a threat to a credit institution’s financial position, the competent authority responsible for the supervision of 
the institution shall take appropriate measures. 
136 Art. 18(1), Proposed Directive amending the First Non-Life Insurance Directive, supra note 2 no. (1); Art. 19(1), Proposed 
Directive amending the First Life Assurance Directive, supra note 2 no. (2); Art. 23(1), Proposed Directive amending the 
Investment Services Directive, supra note 2 no. (6); and Art. 25(2), Proposed Directive amending the Banking Directive, supra 
note 2 no. (8). 
137 Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 3, at 7, sub 2, Arts. 5 & 6. 
138 Arts. 7 to 13, Proposed Directive. 
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the exchange of information among the entities in the financial conglomerate and exchange of 
information and cooperation among the competent authorities involved in the supervision of regulated 
entities in a particular financial conglomerate.
139  
The Proposed Directive introduces the so-called co-ordinator.  The competent authorities 
of the Member States concerned shall appoint amongst them a co-ordinator responsible for the 
coordination and exercise of the supplementary supervision of the regulated entities in a financial 
conglomerate.
140 The co-ordinator functions merely as a primus inter pares of the competent authorities 
of the Member States involved with the regulated entities of a financial conglomerate.
141 A co-ordinator 
must be nominated not only for cross-border financial conglomerates but also for financial conglomerates 
that have several regulated entities in one Member State and at least two supervisory authorities are 
involved.
142 In the absence of an agreement among the competent authorities about the selection of a co-
ordinator, the co-ordinator is identified on the basis of criteria set forth in the Proposed Directive.
143 
The tasks of the co-ordinator with regard to supplementary supervision are:
144 (i) the 
coordination of gathering and disseminating of relevant or essential information in going concern and 
emergency situations, (ii) the assessment of the financial situation, and the overview and monitoring of 
the compliance with the rules on capital adequacy, risk concentration and intra-group transactions,
145 (iii) 
the assessment of the financial conglomerate’s structure, organization and internal control systems, and 
(iv) the planning and coordination of supervisory activities in going concern as well as in emergency 
situations, in cooperation with the relevant competent authorities involved. 
The co-ordinator has no decision-making or enforcement authority to impose measures 
and sanctions.
146 The presence of a co-ordinator entrusted with specific tasks on the supplementary 
supervision does not affect the tasks and responsibilities of the competent authorities responsible for the 
regulated entities in a financial conglomerate as provided by the sectoral rules.
147 
To ensure proper supplementary supervision, the competent authorities responsible for 
the supervision of regulated entities in a financial conglomerate are required to cooperate closely.
148 They 
shall provide each other with any information that is essential or relevant for the exercise of the other 
                                                 
139 Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 3, at 7 sub 2, Arts. 7 to 13. 
140 Arts. 7(1) & (2), Proposed Directive. The co-ordinator may be composed of more than one competent authority.  Art. 7(1), 
Proposed Directive. The competent authorities of the Member State in which a mixed financial holding company is set up 
participate in the selection of the co-ordinator. Art. 7(2), Proposed Directive. 
141 See Economic and Financial Committee, Report on Financial Stability (Brussels Apr. 2000), EFC/ECFIN/240/00–Final, 
available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/publications/economic_papers/2001/ecp143en.pdf (last visited 
Mar. 25, 2002) [herein Brouwer Report], at 17, sub V.1. 
142 Although the language of the Proposed Directive is not clear, it follows from Art. 7(2)(b)(ii), third subparagraph, Proposed 
Directive, that the competent authorities that appoint a co-ordinator may all be located in one Member State. 
143 Art. 7(2), Proposed Directive. 
144 Art. 8(1), Proposed Directive. 
145 See Arts. 5 & 6, Proposed Directive. 
146 See Report of the Presidency of the Council of the European Union, supra note 13, at 4, sub 2. 
147 Art. 8(2), Proposed Directive. 
148 Art. 9(1), Proposed Directive. 
  25  
competent authorities’ supervisory tasks, and provide the co-ordinator with any information that is 
relevant for the exercise of his task.
149 The competent authorities shall communicate on request all 
relevant information and shall communicate on their own initiative all essential information.
150 The 
competent authorities shall consult with each other with regard to the following decisions, where these 
decisions are important for the supervisory tasks of other competent authorities: (i) changes in 
shareholder, organizational or management structure of regulated entities in a financial conglomerate, that 
require the approval or authorization of competent authorities and (ii) major sanctions or exceptional 
measures taken by the competent authorities.
151 
E. 
                                                
Parent Undertakings Outside the European Union 
If the parent undertaking of a financial conglomerate is a regulated entity or a mixed 
financial holding company having its head office outside the EU, the regulated entities in the EU 
belonging to such a “non-EU group” cannot be subject to the same rules on supplementary supervision as 
regulated entities in an “EU group”, however, the Proposed Directive attempts to apply as much 
supplementary supervision as possible.
152 The competent authority of the EU Member State must verify 
whether the regulated entities in the EU, the parent undertaking of which has its head office outside the 
EU, are subject to supervision by a third country competent authority that is equivalent to the 
supplementary supervision of regulated entities of the Proposed Directive.
153 The verification shall be 
done by the authority that would be responsible for the supplementary supervision in the absence of 
equivalent supervision by the third country.
154 The Member State of such authority must then notify the 
Commission and the other Member States of each case of equivalent supervision it has recognized or 
intends to recognize.  If within two months of such notice an objection is raised by a Member State or the 
Commission regarding the equivalence of such supervision, the Commission must subject the matter to a 
regulatory procedure.
155 
Whereas the U.S. rules on comprehensive supervision on a consolidated basis
156 ask 
whether the foreign bank having an establishment in the United States is properly supervised by its home 
country, the Proposed Directive asks whether the EU affiliates of the foreign entity are subject to 
(supplementary) supervision by the non-EU regulation of the non-EU parent company. 
 
149 Id. 
150 Id. Art. 9(1), Proposed Directive enumerates eight categories of information that shall be gathered and exchanged. Member 
States shall authorize the exchange of information between the competent authorities and between the competent authorities 
and other authorities as referred to in Art. 9(1) & (2), Proposed Directive. 
151 Art. 9(1), fourth subparagraph, Proposed Directive. 
152 Arts. 4(3) & 14, Proposed Directive. See Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 3, at 7, sub 2, Art. 14. 
153 Art. 14(1), Proposed Directive, referring to the provisions on supplementary supervision in Art. 4(2), Proposed Directive.  
154 Art. 14(1), Proposed Directive. See Art. 14(2), Proposed Directive. 
155 Art. 14(1), in connection with Art. 17(2), Proposed Directive. The regulatory procedure is laid down in Art. 5 of Council 
Decision 1999/468/EC of 28 June 1999 laying down the procedures for the exercise of implementing powers conferred on the 
Commission, O.J. Eur. Comm. No. L 184/23 (1999). See Arts. 14(1) & 17(2), Proposed Directive. Art. 9(3), Proposed 
Directive. 
156 See 12 C.F.R. § 225.92(e)(1) & (2) (2002) (Regulation Y); 12 C.F.R. § 211.24(c)(1)(i)(A) (2002) (Regulation K); 12 C.F.R. 
§ 225.13(a)(4) (2002) (Regulation Y). 
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In the absence of such equivalent supervision, EU Member States shall apply to the 
regulated entity, by analogy, the provision with regard to supplementary supervision of regulated entities 
set forth in the Proposed Directive.
157 As an alternative to the application of the supplementary 
supervision rules by analogy, the Member States may allow their competent authorities to apply other 
methods that ensure an appropriate supplementary supervision of the regulated entities in a financial 
conglomerate.
158 The competent authorities may in particular require the creation of a sub-holding 
company (which would be a mixed financial holding company) that has its head office in the EU, and 
apply the supplementary supervision to the regulated entities in the financial conglomerate headed by the 
European sub-holding company.
159 In any case, the methods selected by the competent authorities to 
ensure an appropriate supplementary supervision must achieve the objectives set out in the Proposed 
Directive and must be notified to the other Member States and the Commission.
160 This notice triggers the 
procedure set forth above: if within two months of such notice an objection is raised by a Member State 
or the Commission regarding the equivalence of supplementary supervision, the Commission must 
subject the matter to a regulatory procedure.
161 
The Proposed Directive - different from the US Bank Holding Company Act - does not 
attempt to regulate non-EU holding companies that control regulated entities in the EU.   The Member 
States together with the Commission, may assess the equivalence of the supplementary supervisions by 
the non-EU home state of parent companies with a head office outside the EU over EU-regulated entities.  
In the absence of a finding of equivalence, the Member States may require the formation of an EU sub-
financial conglomerate.  This subgroup would not be insulated against acts by the non-EU holding 
company.  The Proposed Directive states however, that the creation of an EU sub-financial conglomerate 
“must achieve the objectives of the supplementary supervision as defined in this Directive”.
162 
V. 
                                                
Conclusion 
The growing consolidation process in the financial industry created a number of new 
prudential risks, which must be faced.  The Proposed Directive marks an important step in keeping up 
supervisory instruments with the development of an integrated world financial market.  It is a significant 
step in the right direction.  However, there are some weaknesses in the Proposed Directive that should be 
pointed out. 
The high degree of discretion given to the Member States and their supervisory 
authorities could possibly lead to enormous differences in the definition of financial conglomerates and in 
national supervisory rules and practices relating to financial conglomerates throughout the EU.  This 
 
157 Art. 14(2), Proposed Directive. The provision referred to in Art. 14(2), Proposed Directive is Art. 4(2), Proposed Directive. 
See supra part III.C. It is not clear what application “by analogy” means. Presumably, it means “to the extent possible.” 
158 Art. 14(3), Proposed Directive. According to Art. 14(3), second sentence, Proposed Directive.  Those methods must be agreed 
upon at least by the competent authorities responsible for the sectoral group-wide supervision of the regulated entities in the 
financial conglomerate and where relevant by other competent authorities concerned.  Id. 
159 Art. 14(3), third sentence, Proposed Directive. 
160 Art. 14(3), ultimate sentence, Proposed Directive. 
161 Art. 14(3), ultimate sentence, in connection with Art. 14(1), penultimate sentence, Proposed Directive. See supra note 155. 
162 Art. 14(3), ultimate sentence, Proposed Directive. 
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would not only create legal uncertainties but could also cause competitive distortions.
163  Generally 
speaking, it would be preferable to reduce the national options in the Directive. 
Under the current version of the Proposed Directive, it is extremely difficult to determine 
which groups are financial conglomerates and to determine the undertakings that should be subject to 
supplementary supervision.  Especially the definition of a group is extremely complicated and hard to 
understand.  In addition, the Member States have much discretion in that regard.  Therefore, the Finnish 
Delegation and the European Parliament’s Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs proposed 
different approaches to define a group by simplifying and narrowing the definition.
164  It has also been 
suggested to establish a procedure for identifying a financial conglomerate.
165 
Some commentators have expressed the view that the 50% threshold in Art. 3(1), 
Proposed Directive, defining whether the activities of a group consist mainly in providing financial 
services
166 should be lowered.  Otherwise large industrial groups with significant financial activities 
would not be covered by the Directive and consequently escape any form of supervision.
167 The question 
should be raised why the relative size of financial services as compared to non-financial services in a 
conglomerate is a relevant consideration.  All credit institutions that are subsidiaries of principally non-
financial conglomerates are exposed to the dangers from which the Proposed Directive is intended to 
protect the credit institution and the public. 
The Proposed Directive provides that the competent supervisory authority decides which 
of the methods for the calculation of the supplementary capital adequacy should be applied.
168  It would 
be desirable to leave the choice of the calculation method to the financial conglomerate in order to give 
companies more flexibility.
169 
Finally, it is quite astonishing to note that the Proposed Directive hesitates to regulate 
non-EU holding companies directly.
170 The United States banking legislation does not show such 
hesitation with respect to foreign holding companies.  For example, the U.S. Bank Holding Company Act 
applies not only to U.S. banks but also to foreign banks that have a U.S. bank subsidiary
171 and foreign 
banks that maintain a branch, agency or commercial lending company in the United States.
172 
                                                 
163 See Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee, supra note 13, at 4, sub 3.7. 
164 See Note of the Finnish Delegation, supra note 13, at 3; Report of the European Parliament’s Committee on Economic and 
Monetary Affairs, supra note 13, at 7. 
165 See Opinion of the European Central Bank, supra note 13, at 11, sub 5; Note of the Finnish Delegation, supra note 13, at 5. 
166 Art. 3(1), Proposed Directive is discussed supra part III.B. 
167 See Report of the European Parliament’s Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, supra note 13, at 33; Position Paper 
of the Banking Federation of the European Union, supra note 13, at 6. 
168 See Annex I, sub II, Method 4, Proposed Directive discussed supra part IV.A. 
169 See Report of the European Parliament’s Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, supra note 13, at 28 & 34; Position 
Paper of the Banking Federation of the European Union, supra note 13, at 11. 
170 See Arts. 4(3) & 14, Proposed Directive as discussed supra part IV.E. 
171 The Bank Holding Company Act applies directly to such foreign banks. 
172 Section 8(a), International Banking Act of 1978, 12 U.S.C. § 3106(a) (1994). For a further discussion of supervision of foreign 
banks in the United States see Michael Gruson, 1 REGULATION OF FOREIGN BANKS, UNITED STATES AND INTERNATIONAL 
(Michael Gruson & Ralph Reisner eds., 3d ed. 2000). 
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